This Comment argues that Stephen Bush's critique of Georges Bataille's meditative practice fails to recognize how the disruption of the self, and the challenge to goal-oriented activity that comprise the heart of that practice, serve as an ethical limit that protects against sadistic and violent engagement with the world. The ethical disposition fostered by Bataille's practice is a dissolution of the self. In this reply to Kent Brintnall's response to my essay on Georges Bataille and the ethics of ecstasy, (...) I explore two primary questions: whether instrumentalization is inherently violent and non-instrumentalization is inherently non-violent, and whether there is a way to intervene in the world that avoids both "apathetic disengagement" and domination. I endorse the view that instrumentalization can be good as well as bad, and I suggest that it is possible to strive to intervene in the world without striving to master it. I make reference to Sarah Coakley as a Christian theologian who advances particular practices that aim for non-dominating intervention in theworld. (shrink)

Applied Christian Ethics addresses selected themes in Christian social ethics. Part one shows the roots of contributors in the realist school; part two focuses on different levels of the significance of economics for social justice; and part three deals with both existential experience and government policy in war and peace issues.

Nicolas Gueudeville's 1715 French translation of Utopia is often dismissed as a “belle infidèle,” an elegant but unfaithful work of translation. Gueudeville does indeed expand the text to nearly twice its original length. But he presents Utopia as a contribution to emergent debates on tolerance, natural religion, and political anthropology, directly addressing the concerns of many early advocates of the ideas we associate with Enlightenment. In this sense, it is not as much an “unfaithful” presentation of More's project as it (...) is an attempt to introduce Utopia to eighteenth-century francophone audiences—readers for whom theses on political economy and natural religion were much more salient than More's own preoccupations with rhetoric and English law. This paper introduces Gueudeville and his oeuvre, paying particular attention to his revisions to Louis-Armand de Lom d'Arce, Baron de Lahontan's 1703 Nouveaux Voyages dans l'Amérique Septentrionale. Published in 1705, Gueudeville's “revised, corrected, & augmented” version of Lahontan's Voyages foregrounds the rational and natural religion of the Huron as well as their constitutive aversion to property, to concepts of “mine” and “yours.” Gueudeville's revised version of Lahontan's Voyages purports to be an anthropological investigation as well as a study of New World political economy; it looks forward, moreover, to his edition of Utopia, framing More's work as a comparable study of political economy and anthropology. Gueudeville, in other words, renders More's Utopia legible to Enlightenment audiences, depicting Utopia not in terms of impossibility and irony but rather as a study of natural religion and attendant forms of political, devotional, and economic life. Gueudeville's edition of Utopia even proved controversial due, in part, to his insistence on the rationality as well as the possibility of Utopia. (shrink)

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field.

Introduction -- Value theory : the nature of the good life -- Epicurus letter to Menoeceus -- John Stuart Mill, Hedonism -- Aldous Huxley, Brave new world -- Robert Nozick, The experience machine -- Richard Taylor, The meaning of life -- Jean Kazez, Necessities -- Normative ethics : theories of right conduct -- J.J.C. Smart, Eextreme and restricted utilitarianism -- Immanuel Kant the good will & the categorical imperative -- Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan -- Philippa Foot, Natural goodness -- Aristotle, Nicomachean (...) ethics -- W.D. Ross, What makes right acts right? -- Hilde Lindemann, What is feminist ethics? -- Metaethics : the status of morality -- David Hume, Moral distinctions not derived from reason -- J.L. Mackie, The subjectivity of values -- Gilbert Harman, Ethics and observation -- Mary Midgley, Trying out one's new sword -- Michael Smith, Rrealism -- Renford Bambrough, Pproof -- Moral problems -- Peter Singe, The Singer solution to world poverty -- Heidi Malm, Paid surrogacy: arguments and responses -- Ronald Dworkin, Playing God : genes, clones, and luck -- James Rachels, The morality of euthanasia -- John Harris, The survival lottery -- Peter Singer, Unsanctifying human life -- William F. Baxter, People or penguins : the case for optimal pollution -- Judith Jarvis, Tthomson a defense of abortion -- Don Marquis, Why abortion is immoral -- Jonathan Bennett, The conscience of Huckleberry Finn -- Michael Walzer, Terrorism : a critique of excuses -- David Luban, Liberalism, torture, and the ticking bomb -- Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail -- Igor Primoratz, Justifying legal punishment -- Stephen Nathanson, An eye for an eye -- Michael Huemer, America's unjust drug war -- John Corvino, Why shouldn't Tommy and Jimmy have sex? : a defense of homosexuality -- Bonnie Steinbock, Adultery -- Hugh Lafollette, Licensing parents -- Jane English, What do grown children owe their parents? (shrink)

Il s’agit dans cet article de dégager une certaine disposition de la philosophie russe envers la traduction comme opération fondamentale de la pensée. On considérera les cas précis des trois penseurs jouissant d’un prestige européen – Léon Chestov, Mikhaïl Bakhtine et Valery Podoroga. Cette disposition, considérée dans le geste des philosophes face à l’intraduisible, se manifesterait tout simplement par la violence, faite à l’original, de la non-hospitalité culturelle. Cette dernière est masquée parfois par l’idée reçue de l’omniréceptivité de la culture (...) russe, exprimée naguère par Dostoïevski dans son hommage à Pouchkine. (shrink)

La polémique entre V. Soloviev et L. Lopatine met en lumière les recherches de la philosophie russe sur son mode propre de compréhension du Moi. Pour Soloviev, on ne peut attribuer au sujet de la conscience en tant que tel une réalité autre que phénoménologique. Lopatine propose une variante, proche de Leibniz, selon laquelle le Moi est une conscience subjective, présente aux différents niveaux du développement spirituel. Cette interprétation est reprise et développée, dans une certaine mesure, par N. Losski. G. (...) Chpet tire un bilan de la discussion, en posant le caractère « communautaire » [ obščnost ’] particulier du Moi, qui se réalise non par la « généralisation » [ obobščenie ] mais par la « communication » [ obščenie ]. (shrink)

Research in the discipline of international relations finds that the great democratic powers are less likely to pursue revisionist policies. This investigation challenges this argument by showing that the United States' decision to oust Saddam Hussein's regime in March 2003 was consistent with a modified version of John Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism, which finds that great powers' motivation is global hegemony. This article is divided into three sections. The first section considers the value of Mearsheimer's theory and reworks it (...) by adding domestic variables to explain why states abandon defensive strategies for offensive ones. The second section shows how pre-9/11 American foreign policy strategy was, for the most part, status quo oriented, and section three explains why and how the Bush administration introduced a revisionist foreign policy strategy after the 9/11 attacks. This investigation concludes by showing how the 2003 Iraq War is the first step in the United States' quest for global hegemony. (shrink)

Der erste amerikanische Krieg von 1991 gegen Saddam Hussein war moralisch falsch. Man muss kein radikaler Pazifist sein, um zu diesem Urteil zu kommen, denn dies Urteil ergibt sich auch dann, wenn man die drei Kriegsziele ernst und beim Wort nimmt, die George Bush zur Rechtfertigung des Kriegs angeführt hat. In der Tat sind es auf den ersten Blick löbliche Ziele, Kuwait von der Besatzung durch irakische Truppen zu befreien, Saddam Husseins Militärmacht einzudämmen und für eine gerechte Weltordnung zu (...) kämpfen. Doch wenn man die Opfer in den Blick nimmt, die der Krieg kostet, ändert sich das Bild – die Kriegsopfer wiegen schwerer als der erhoffte Vorteil des Kriegs, und also war der Krieg moralisch unverantwortlich. (shrink)

This article adds to earlier research revealing that the American news media did not discharge their responsibility as a watchdog press in the post-9/11 years by failing to scrutinize extreme and unlawful government policies and actions, most of all the decision to invade Iraq based on false information about Saddam Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction arsenal. The content analyses presented here demonstrate that leading US news organizations, both television and print, did not expressly refer to human rights violations when (...) they reported on the torturing of foreign detainees during “enhanced interrogations” in US-run prison facilities abroad and the killing of civilians, including children, in US drone strikes overseas and outside theaters of war. Moreover, by framing torture and the “collateral damage” caused by drone-launched missile attacks episodically rather than in the context of human rights, the news media failed to alert the American public to the grave humanitarian violations in the so-called war on terrorism during the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. (shrink)

Considering the play written by Daniel Berrigan about his own civil disobedience (burning hundreds of draft files in Catonsville, Maryland), the author asks whether Catholics have adopted the American dream at the expense of Christianity. How should we live and philosophize in an age of American empire? Philosophy must be both practical and transformative. We need to question our political situation since 2001, and arrive at a liberatory philosophy and social theory “from below” so as to meet Berrigan’s liberatory, prophetic (...) theology “from above,” resulting in a philosophy and theology of liberation of and from the seductive imperialist center. The author further stresses individual self-appropriation and the critique of imperialism through a Marxist understanding of surplus value (as arising from labor time for which workers are not paid). There is a link between capitalistic imperialism and militarism, and President Bush has made illegitimate use of religion in the attempt to legitimate empire. Liberation is the good and the happiness that together result from doing the work of justice, free from capitalist corruption. In challenging capitalist empire, we ought to aim for the “downward mobility” of a simpler lifestyle, where self-appropriation leads to moral, religious, and practical conversion. An inhumane, capitalist society is fundamentally at odds with us as human beings, as philosophers, and as Christians. (shrink)

The underlying skepticism of ancient Greek culture made it unreceptive of philosophy. It was the Catholic Church that embraced philosophy. Still, Étienne Gilson reminds us in Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages that some early Christians rejected philosophy. Their rejection was based on fideism: the view that faith alone provides knowledge. Philosophy is unnecessary and dangerous, fideists argue, because (1) anything known by reason can be better known by faith, and (2) reason, on account of the sin of pride, (...) seeks to replace faith. To support this twofold claim, fideists, like Tertullian and Tatian, quote St. Paul. However, a judicious interpretation of St. Paul’s remarks shows that he does not object to philosophy per se but to erroneous philosophy. This interpretation is reinforced by St. Paul’s own background in philosophy and by his willingness to engage intellectuals critical of Christianity in the public square. The challenge of fideism brings up the interesting question: what would Jesus himself say about the discipline of philosophy? Could it be that Jesus himself was a philosopher (as George Bush once declared)? As the fullness of wisdom and intelligence, Jesus certainly understood philosophy, although not in the conventional sense. But surely, interpreting his life through the lens of fideism is unconvincing. Instead, an appreciation of his innate philosophical skills serves better to understand important elements of his mission. His perfect grasp of how grace perfects nature includes a philosophy of the human person. This philosophy grounded in common-sense analysis of human experience enables Jesus to be a profound moral philosopher. Specifically, he is able to explain the principles of personal actualization. Relying on ordinary experience, where good philosophy must start, he narrates moral lessons—parables—that illumine difficulties regarding moral responsibility and virtue. These parables are accessible but profound, showing how moral understanding must transcend Pharisaical legalism. Additionally, Jesus’ native philosophical power shows in his ability to explain away doctrinal confusions and to expose sophistical traps set by his enemies. If fideism is unconvincing, and if the great examples of the Patristics, the Apostles, and Jesus himself show an affinity for philosophy, then it is necessary to conclude that Christianity is a rational religion. Accordingly, the history of Christian culture is arguably an adventure in faith and reason. Since God is truth and the author of all truths, there is nothing in reality that is incompatible with Christian teaching. As John Paul II explains effectively in the encyclical, Fides et Ratio, Christianity is a religion that is rational and can defend itself. This ability to marshal a defense makes Christianity a religion for all seasons. (shrink)

The underlying skepticism of ancient Greek culture made it unreceptive of philosophy. It was the Catholic Church that embraced philosophy. Still, Étienne Gilson reminds us in Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages that some early Christians rejected philosophy. Their rejection was based on fideism: the view that faith alone provides knowledge. Philosophy is unnecessary and dangerous, fideists argue, because (1) anything known by reason can be better known by faith, and (2) reason, on account of the sin of pride, (...) seeks to replace faith. To support this twofold claim, fideists, like Tertullian and Tatian, quote St. Paul. However, a judicious interpretation of St. Paul’s remarks show that he does not object to philosophy per se but to erroneous philosophy. This interpretation is reinforced by St. Paul’s own background in philosophy and by his willingness to engage intellectuals critical of Christianity in the public square. The challenge of fideism brings up the interesting question: what would Jesus himself say about the discipline of philosophy? Could it be that Jesus himself was a philosopher (as George Bush once declared)? As the fullness of wisdom and intelligence, Jesus certainly understood philosophy, although not in the conventional sense. But surely, interpreting his life through the lens of fideism is unconvincing. Instead, an appreciation of his innate philosophical skills serves better to understand important elements of his mission. His perfect grasp of how grace perfects nature includes a philosophy of the human person. This philosophy grounded in common-sense analysis of human experience enables Jesus to be a profound moral philosopher. Specifically, he is able to explain the principles of personal actualization. Relying on ordinary experience, where good philosophy must start, he narrates moral lessons—parables—that illumine difficulties regarding moral responsibility and virtue. These parables are accessible but profound, showing how moral understanding must transcend Pharisaical legalism. Additionally, Jesus’ native philosophical power shows in his ability to explain away doctrinal confusions and to expose sophistical traps set by his enemies. If fideism is unconvincing, and if the great examples of the Patristics, the Apostles, and Jesus himself show an affinity for philosophy, then it is necessary to conclude that Christianity is a rational religion. Accordingly, the history of Christian culture is arguably an adventure in faith and reason. Since God is truth and the author of all truths, there is nothing in reality that is incompatible with Christian teaching. As John Paul II explains effectively in the encyclical, Fides et Ratio, Christianity is a religion that is rational and can defend itself. This ability to marshal a defense makes Christianity a religion for all seasons. (shrink)

Considering the play written by Daniel Berrigan about his own civil disobedience (burning hundreds of draft files in Catonsville, Maryland), the author asks whether Catholics have adopted the American dream at the expense of Christianity. How should we live and philosophize in an age of American empire? Philosophy must be both practical and transformative. We need to question our political situation since 2001, and arrive at a liberatory philosophy and social theory “from below” so as to meet Berrigan’s liberatory, prophetic (...) theology “from above,” resulting in a philosophy and theology of liberation of and from the seductive imperialist center. The author further stresses individual self-appropriation and the critique of imperialism through a Marxist understanding of surplus value (as arising from labor time for which workers are not paid). There is a link between capitalistic imperialism and militarism, and President Bush has made illegitimate use of religion in the attempt to legitimate empire. Liberation is the good and the happiness that together result from doing the work of justice, free from capitalist corruption. In challenging capitalist empire, we ought to aim for the “downward mobility” of a simpler lifestyle, where self-appropriation leads to moral, religious, and practical conversion. An inhumane, capitalist society is fundamentally at odds with us as human beings, as philosophers, and as Christians. (shrink)

Zimbabwe's communal farmers are now less food secure than they were two generations ago. The roots of this decline lie not only in the confinement of Africans to marginal land but also in the historic forced replacement of their sustainable, indigenous farming system with one whose productivity now relies on the use of large amounts of expensive chemical inputs. Environmentally-friendly, traditional farming practices such as pyro-culture, minimum tillage, mixed cropping, and bush fallowing were completely wiped out and replaced with (...) a highly technical western or ganic farming system based on plough cultivation and continuous monocultures of commodity crops, that were supposed to be sustained by liberal amounts of green and animal manures. This gave rise to an effective agricultural hegemony that was due, mainly, to the zealous dedication of an American Mormon missionary whose motives were evangelical rather than scientific. (shrink)

Utopian imagination and the principle of hope have fallen on hard times. It has become almost a commonplace that utopian visions are obsolete. The present state of world affairs seems to paralyze utopian thinking. In an age of worldwide exploitation and destruction of nature (the greenhouse effect), epidemic diseases (AIDS), and Bush's “War on Terror,” the future of mankind appears bleak and apocalyptic images dominate our imagination. Especially the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, if that was supposed to (...) be a utopia at all, has shattered all dreams of century-old social utopias. Utopia is draped in a mourning veil,…. (shrink)

This article examines the requirements for ethical press apologias, defined as attempts to defend credibility when accused of ethical failure. Facing changing transparency expectations, apologists may fail to fully respond to injured stakeholders. Criticisms of CBS News' flawed report on President Bush's National Guard service illustrated this problem. Hearit's (2005b) paradigm for ethical apologias is applied to ?RatherGate? to see if and where the paradigmatic criteria fell short. A revised paradigm is proposed.

This Comment argues that Stephen Bush's critique of Georges Bataille's meditative practice fails to recognize how the disruption of the self, and the challenge to goal-oriented activity that comprise the heart of that practice, serve as an ethical limit that protects against sadistic and violent engagement with the world. The ethical disposition fostered by Bataille's practice is a dissolution of the self.

This paper examines the three US national security strategies released by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama since 9/11. These national security strategies are required presidential statements describing US plans for national security. The authors analyze Bush’s two and Obama’s one post-9/11 national security strategies and evaluate the argumentative framework of imperial righteousness in the documents. The rhetoric of American imperial righteousness contains four themes: national security, the nature of the enemy, freedom and democracy, and American morality. (...) While there are some differences between the documents, the authors argue that Bush and Obama both promoted the idea of imperial righteousness in their plans for American national security. Moreover, the four themes of imperial righteousness worked together effectively to advance America’s interests in world affairs. (shrink)

The Russian icon was always related to the soul of the Russian painter, his anxiety and his emotions. Through the icon the russian has always expressed his faith and mentained the bundle with God. The icon has been considered by the russian people a bridge between human and divinity. The Russian people belive into an russian Christ. The Russian icon embodys the russian nature, his strength of creation and of adaption, but especially the russian soul. It is been capitalized the (...) icon painting of the greatest painters: Andrei Rubliov, Teofan Grecul Dionisie, as well as icon painting, starting from the novgorodiana school (the 11th century) till the 20th century, when big names of icon artists appared, such as Kondrafiev, Filatov, Zubov, A. Ivanov. (shrink)

The Russian icon was always related to the soul of the Russian painter, his anxiety and his emotions. Through the icon the russian has always expressed his faith and mentained the bundle with God. The icon has been considered by the russian people a bridge between human and divinity. The Russian people belive into an russian Christ. The Russian icon embodys the russian nature, his strength of creation and of adaption, but especially the russian soul. It is been capitalized the (...) icon painting of the greatest painters: Andrei Rubliov, Teofan Grecul Dionisie, as well as icon painting, starting from the novgorodiana school (the 11th century) till the 20th century, when big names of icon artists appared, such as Kondrafiev, Filatov, Zubov, A. Ivanov. (shrink)

Depuis 2011-2012, les milieux de migrants russes en France se mobilisent politiquement. On peut observer, d’une part, une mobilisation liée aux mouvements de protestation en Russie à la suite des élections jugées « truquées » et, d’autre part, une mobilisation encouragée par la politique de l’État russe envers « ses » émigrés. L’histoire, le passé, jouent un rôle primordial dans ces mobilisations. Du côté des autorités russes, les concepts et moments clés de l’histoire nationale sont mobilisés pour une construction consensuelle (...) qui est par la suite « imposée » aux migrants, perçus comme les messagers de la parole des autorités russes dans les pays d’accueil. Cependant, cette reconstruction historique par l’État russe se confronte à des contradictions qui sont à la fois internes au projet de l’État russe et relatives aux temporalités subjectives des migrants. Ces dernières fournissent autant de contrepoints et de formes de contestation, explicite ou non, au récit historique unifié que s’efforcent de bâtir les autorités russes. Ces temporalités subjectives se traduisent par des identifications : avec les années 1990 qui, dans le discours politique sur l’histoire russe, sont perçues comme des « années noires » ; avec une « classe sociale » qui appartient au passé ; et enfin, avec des segments spécifiques de l’histoire et de l’espace russes, loin des conceptions totalisantes forgées par le projet extraterritorial des autorités. (shrink)

Depuis longtemps, la recherche met en relief les influences françaises et allemandes de la pensée de Georges Gurvitch. De récents travaux ouvrent désormais la voie à l’étude de ses sources russes. Cet article vise à poser les bases de l’étude des sources russes de la pensée de Gurvitch. Pour ce faire, il recourt à onze articles publiés par Gurvitch, entre 1924 et 1931, dans la revue russe de l’émigration Annales contemporaines, dont il dégage une propension marquée à l’endroit des totalités (...) sociales. L’article comprend, en outre, une brève étude du parcours russe de Gurvitch ainsi qu’une traduction intégrale de la dernière partie de l’article « Éthique et religion ». (shrink)

Résumé L’exploitation de nouvelles sources permet une recontextualisation des tentatives visant, au XVIIe siècle, à ouvrir une route de la soie russe, et principalement des projets de Frédéric III de Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorf. L’article montre que ces projets, en dépit de leur caractère chimérique, s’inscrivaient dans les réseaux du commerce nord-ouest-européen vers la Russie, mais aussi qu’ils jouaient un rôle dans les évolutions de ceux-ci. Cela souligne la pertinence d’ambitions commerciales extra-européennes comme objet d’histoire européenne.